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ABSTRACT
The idea of the direct exercise of the people’s power was raised  for the 
first time in Hungary in the 1790’s by members of the Hungarian Jacobin 
movement: Ignác Martinovics’s draft constitution of 1793 adopted direct 
democratic elements of the French Montagnard Contitution (1793), but it 
did not become an effective law in the end.
During the times of the Hungarian bourgeois transformation (1825-1848), 
the neo-absolutism (1849-1867) and of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
(1867-1918)  the  idea  of  different  popular  rights  were  only  rarely 
addressed on the political agenda. Thus the right to instruct and to recall 
parliamentary deputies – customary of nobleman’s county assemblies at 
the  time  –  remained  a  debated  question  (see  e.g.  the  Kütahya  draft 
constitution  of  Lajos  Kossuth),  although  since  1848  Hungarian 
constitutional  laws did not admit this practice.  In 1903, the Hungarian 
Social  Democratic  Party  included  –  presumably  inspired  by  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  of  Germany  –  “the  direct  legislation  of  the  people 
manifested  in  their  right  to  initiate  and  to  ››throw  out‹‹  laws”  in  its 
program.
At the end of the First World War, Oszkár Jászi, Minister of Nationalities of 
the Károlyi Government, intended to form a cantonal system based on the 
Swiss model in Hungary and to hold referendums concerning Hungarian 
borders  but  this  idea was refused by the Allied Powers.  It  came to a 
territorial  plebiscite only once, in December 1921, in case of the town 
Sopron and its surroundings, according to a special agreement between 
Austria and Hungary.
In  the  socialist  era  the  Hungarian  Constitution  of  1949  enabled  both 
optional legislative referendums and the recall of parliamentary deputies, 
but neither  of  them was implemented in  practice  until  the  end of  the 
eighties. “Village meetings” and “public discussions” on local level didn’t 
have any real power over local authorities.
The “breakthrough” of direct democratic institutions is a product of the 
political transformation of 1989. Since then there have been six national 
referendums on twelve  questions  in  Hungary.  The  paper  sums up the 
experience  thereof  and  the  Constitutional  Court’s  most  important 
decisions on direct democratic institutions.
A paper presented at Centre for Research on Direct Democracy in Aarau 
on the 7th of June, 2010. It is a revised and enlarged version of a paper  
presented  at  the  conference  of  the  International  Commission  for  the 
History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions in Lisbon on the 
2nd of September, 2009. The revised and enlarged version was completed 
with support provided by the Hungarian State Eötvös Scholarship.
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1. Introduction
When  mentioning  popular  rights  in  Hungary,  one  would  certainly  first 
think of direct democratic institutions adopted at the time of the political 
change  in  1989  and  of  their  practice  during  the  last  twenty  years. 
However, Hungary wasn’t totally left untouched by direct democratic ideas 
in  earlier  times  either.  Therefore,  when  examining  popular  rights  in 
Hungary  from  an  historical  perspective  we  must  first  take  into 
consideration the antecedents and thus come to the breakthrough in the 
late eighties and to the pertaining use of direct democratic instruments 
since that time.
2. The Hungarian Jacobin movement (1793-1795)
The idea of direct democracy appeared in Hungary for the first time at the 
end of the 18th century. When the news of the French Revolution in 1789 
got through to Hungary, the country was under Habsburg rule. Hungary 
represented a relatively autonomous part of the Habsburg Empire, with its 
own legislation but under the hereditary reign of the Habsburg dynasty 
and  in  an  “indivisible  and  inseparable”  community  with  the  other 
Habsburg territories.
The most active propagator of the revolutionary ideas at that time was the 
Hungarian  Jacobin  movement.  They  were  the  first  to  ever  raise  the 
question of direct democracy in Hungary. The leader of the movement, 
Ignác Martinovics (1755-1795) – a former Franciscan friar, professor of 
natural  history  at  the  university  of  Lemberg  –  established  secret 
organisations  from 1794 based on  the  French model  –  the  Society  of 
Reformers, the Society of Liberty and Equality – in order to launch the 
insurrection of Hungarian noblemen, to break off  the country from the 
Habsburg  territories  and  dynasty,  to  abolish  feudal  institutions  and  to 
create a free and democratic Hungarian republic.1
The leading figures of the movement professed the ideas of the French 
enlightenment and wanted to assert the popular sovereignty in state life. 
As revealed in the documents of the investigations against the societies, 
József  Hajnóczy  (1750-1795),  a  talented  member  of  the  revolutionary 
group,  who as  an  enthusiastic  journalist  propagated  the  French ideas, 
translated the French monarchic Constitution of 1791 into Latin for people 
who didn’t understand French, followed by the Constitution of the First 
Republic of 1793.2 But the Hungarian Jacobins were not satisfied with a 
mere  copy  and  circulation  of  the  French  documents.  Martinovics  – 
presumably under the inspiration of the French Montagnard Constitution – 
1 Andor  Csizmadia  (ed.),  Hajnóczy  József  közjogi-politikai  munkái,  Budapest,  Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1958, p. 20.
2 György Bónis, Hajnóczy József, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1954, pp. 127-128.
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prepared an original  draft constitution for Hungary in German.3 It  lays 
down – as does the resolution of the French National Convention of the 
21st September 1792 – that the expressed consent of the whole nation is 
required to adopt a new constitution.4 In addition to this,  the people’s 
direct  power  shall  appear  in  the  legislation  as  well:  the  parliamentary 
statutes shall be adopted with the silent agreement of the nation which 
lasts at least six weeks.5 The people shall express both their consent to 
the constitution and the possible veto on statutes in course of so called 
primary assemblies (Urversammlungen) which also have the right to elect 
members of Parliament, to declare their will concerning the level of taxes 
and the proclamation of war.6 However, in case of a decision the king shall 
give his vote first, to the declaration of the primary assemblies comes only 
after.7 It  is  similar  to  the  legislation  process  laid  down in  the  French 
Constitution of the 24th June 1793, where the draft shall be sent to the 
communes of the republic and if ten percent of the primary assemblies set 
up in the majority of the departments do not oppose within forty days, the 
draft becomes law. In case of protest every primary assembly shall be 
called together.8 To put it concisely, the draft constitution of Martinovics 
included the institutions of  the mandatory constitutional  referendum 
and the popular veto on parliamentary statutes. Both originate from 
3 Kálmán Benda (ed.),  A magyar jakobinus mozgalom iratai,  vol.  1,  Budapest,  Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1957, pp. 896-908. The draft was completed in the first days of August 1793.
4 Cap. IV. art. XXII.:  “Doch muss die Konstitution von der ganzen Nation ausdrücklich, und  
alle Gesetze durch vordauerndes Stillschweigen von sechs Wochen angenommen werden.” 
The resolution of the French National Convention of the 21st September 1792: “La Convention 
nationale déclare, 1° qu’il ne peut y avoir de constitution que celle qui est acceptée par le 
peuple…” According to art. 115. of the French Constitution of 24 June 1793 the people can 
request the revision of a Constitutional Act or the amendment of some of its articles in course 
of  primary  assemblies:  “Si,  dans  la  moitié  des  départemens,  plus  un,  le  dixième  des  
assemblées primaires de chacun d’eux, régulièrement formées, demande la révision de l’acte  
constitutionnel,  ou le changement de quelques-uns de ses articles, le Corps-Législatif  est 
tenu de convoquer toutes les assemblées primaires de la République, pour savoir s’il y a lieu  
à une Convention nationale.” Jean Baptiste Henri Duvergier,  Collection complète des lois, 
décrets, ordonnances, réglemens, et avis du Conseil-d’État, vol. 5, Paris, Guyot et Scribe, 
1825, pp. 1., 441.
5 Cap. IV. art. XXII.
6 Cap. VI. art. XLII.: “Die Urversammlungen bestehen aus dem König, ganzem Adel und allen  
Gemeinden  des  Volkes.” Art.  XLIII.:  “Diese  üben  bloss  die  Haupthandlungen  der  
ursprünglichen  Souverainität  aus,  nämlich  bestätigen  oder  verwerfen  den  vom  Landtag 
bestimmten  Konstitutionsentwurf,  wählen  Deputierte  zum  Landtag,  verwerfen  entworfene 
Gesetze,  wenn diese ihnen schädlich  scheinen,  erklären ihren Willen über  die  Höhe der 
Steuer, und über einen zu unternehmenden Krieg.”
7 Cap. VI. art. XLIV.:  “Diese Urversammlungen geschehen auf folgende Art: der König gibt  
über diese Gegenstände seine Stimme allein…”
8 Art. 58.: “Le projet est imprimé et envoyé à toutes les communes de la République, sous ce 
titre: Loi proposée.” Art.  59.:  “Quarante jours après l’envoi  de la loi  proposée, si,  dans la 
moitié des départemens, plus un, le dixième des assemblées primaires de chacun d’eux,  
régulièrement formées, n’a pas réclamé, le projet est accepté, et devient loi.” Art. 60.: “S’il y a 
réclamation, le Corps-Législatif convoque les assemblées primaires.” Duvergier,  Collection 
complète des lois…, vol. 5, p. 439.
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the  French  Constitution  of  the  First  Republic,  although  Martinovics 
intended to adapt them into a monarchic system.9
The draft constitution of Martinovics did not become an effective law in 
the end. Originally it was prepared with the intention of introducing it as a 
bill  and  to  have  it  adopted  by  the  legislative  assembly  of  1793;  the 
proclamations for the conviction of the noblemen were also completed. 
However,  they  were  not  posted,  because  the  king  –  in  view  of  the 
oppositional mood – didn’t convene the Diet, so the draft had finally no 
significant influence. The Jacobin movement was eliminated after a few 
months  by  the  frightened  court,  its  seven  leaders  were  executed  on 
charges of infidelity and high treason on 20th May 1795.
3. The idea of popular rights in Hungary from 1825 to the 
Sopron plebiscite of 1921
3.1. REFORM ERA (1825-1848) AND BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION (1848/49)
As a result of the events mentioned previously, the Hungarian Jacobins’ 
ideas of direct democracy remained isolated. The leading figures of the 
noble  intellectuals  in  the  reform  era  before  the  Hungarian  bourgeois 
revolution of 1848/49 strove for the transformation of feudal society and 
the establishment of a bourgeois representative system, rather than for 
the adoption of French or Swiss forms of direct democracy. In this respect 
the opinion of the lawyer, historian and well-known political writer László 
Szalay (1813-1864) is quite characteristic, when – mentioning the Swiss 
example in 1844 – he argues that it shouldn’t be followed in Hungary: 
“...we all  know, that some cantons gradually accepted the doctrines of 
1791 over the last fifteen years, where not only the popular sovereignty, 
not only the citizens’ equality are set down, but the popular veto and the 
periodical revision of the constitution is also declared by law, moreover 
the right of  resistance – the Ultima Thule of  liberty –,  in other  words 
things we don’t want to follow...”10
The April  Laws of the Revolution of 1848, which demolished the feudal 
structures,  declared  a  pure  representative  legislative  system11 and 
contained  no  direct  democratic  elements,  neither  in  form  of  primary 
assemblies  on  the  French  model  nor  in  form  of  referendum,  popular 
initiative or recall.12 However, the revolutionary fervent sometimes led to 
9 The  regulations  of  Martinovics’s  Draft  Constitution  and  the  correspondent  French 
constitutional laws of 1792/93 concerning popular rights are shown in a parallel version in 
Annex I.
10 László Szalay, “A’ schweitzi diéta ’s a’ foederatív-rendszer”, Pesti Hírlap, 10th July, 1844, 
reprinted  in  László  Szalay,  Publicistai  dolgozatok, vol.  1  (1839-1844),  Pest,  Hackenast 
Gusztáv, 1847, pp. 204-205.
11 Act  IV of  1848 on Annual  Parliament;  Act  V of  1848 on Representative  Election of 
Parliamentary Deputies.
12 For direct democratic aspects of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 
1848/49  see:  István  Szentpéteri,  A  közvetlen  demokrácia  fejlődési  irányai,  Budapest, 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1965, pp. 119-129.
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events, which seemed to be manifestations of the direct exercise of the 
power  of  the  people.  But  the  state  authorities  didn’t  tolerate  these 
ambitions.  For  example  on  the  New Year’s  Day  of  1849  the  Calvinist 
pastor of Tiszabercel, József Litkei arranged a “popular assembly”, which 
decided to abolish the so-called “regalia minora”.13 The tribunal which was 
ordered to the spot sentenced the initiator  to an imprisonment of one 
month.14
There is one single element in the Hungarian bourgeois transformation, 
which  carried  in  itself  the  possibility  of  an  institution  usually  counted 
among  the  popular  rights:  the  question  of  the  recall  of  parliamentary 
representatives. It derived from the right of the former county assemblies 
of  the  nobility  to  elect  deputies  to  the  Hungarian  Diet,  to  give  them 
instructions, to order them at any time account for their work and even to 
recall them without any reason. This right to instruct and recall remained 
a common idea for many people even after the bourgeois transformation 
and the establishing of the representative Parliament, although the April 
Laws of 1848 abolished the right of the counties to send deputies to the 
Parliament and to take part on the legislation process and didn’t contain 
any rules concerning the right to instruct and to recall  representatives. 
The so-called “Hungarian doctrinaires” or centralists,15 who strove for the 
representative system since the 1840ies, steadily refused the possibility of 
the right of instruction and recall.16 The representative Parliament of the 
revolution  itself  adopted  a  resolution,  in  which  it  repealed  a  popular 
decision  on  the  recall  of  a  deputy,  saying:  the  right  to  recall  doesn’t 
exist.17
13 „Regalia minora”:  profitable rights connected with the nobles’ property, e.g. publican’s 
licence, the right to run a butcher’s stall or a flour-mill, to collect customs, the right of 
holding markets etc.
14 Imre Révész, “Az utópista szocialista gondolat magyarországi hatásaihoz”,  Századok, 
vol. 85, 1951/1-2. p. 143. Quoted also by Szentpéteri, A közvetlen demokrácia… pp. 120-
121. fn. 2.
15 Centralists or “Hungarian doctrinaires”: oppositional group on the Hungarian Diet from 
1843/44, mostly young publicists, writers, scholars and noble intellectuals who strove for 
the bourgeois transformation in Hungary and transmitted the ideas of Western liberalism. 
Their leaders were the above mentioned László Szalay, furthermore József Eötvös (1813-
1871), Hungarian writer and statesmen, in 1840 member in the Upper House; from 1866 
president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, 
from 1867 Minister of Education.
16 István Stipta, Kísérlet a vármegyék polgári átalakítására, Budapest, Osiris, 1995, pp. 7-
8, 10-11,  40-41, 78.  For the viewpoint of László Szalay see: László Szalay,  “Évenkinti 
országgyűlés, ’s utasitási rendszer II”, Pesti Hírlap 28st February, 1847, reprinted in László 
Szalay,  Publicistai  dolgozatok, vol.  2 (1844-1847), Pest,  Hackenast Gusztáv,  1847, pp. 
276-278.  For  the  bourgeois  transformation  of  the  counties  see:  István  Stipta,  “Die 
Geschichte  des  ungarischen  Selbstverwaltungssystems”,  in  István  Stipta,  Die  vertikale 
Gewaltentrennung. (Verfassungs- und rechtsgeschichtliche Studien), Budapest, Gondolat, 
2005, pp. 191-300.
17 János Beér (ed.),  Az 1848/49.  évi  népképviseleti  országgyűlés, Budapest,  Akadémiai 
Kiadó, 1954, p. 195. Quoted also by Szentpéteri, A közvetlen demokrácia…, p. 121. fn. 3.
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3.2. NEO-ABSOLUTISM (1849-1867) AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY (1867-1918)
However, there were also those who – either by analogy with the former 
county assemblies or for other reasons – considered the direct control of 
the voters over their representatives to be important. The leading figure 
of the revolution, Lajos Kossuth,18 who fled into exile to Turkey after the 
defeated  war  of  independence,  in  his  draft  constitution  worked  out  in 
Kütahya 1851 –  also  encouraged by the  Italian  revolutionist  Giuseppe 
Mazzini –, Kossuth excluded the possibility of instructions by the voters, 
but would have given a right to recall against representatives of the Lower 
House  (elected  by citizens),  and against  senators  of  the  Upper  House 
(delegated by the counties), for the case of lack of confidence. Besides he 
insisted the county assemblies to discuss the public affairs and to inform 
their  senators  about  their  decisions.  The  draft  of  Kossuth  would  have 
enabled the use of recall against office holders of communes and counties 
as well.19
Also in the last period of the Habsburg neo-absolutism, in the 60’s, when 
the chance to  arrange the constitutional  conditions’  arose again,  there 
were some who thought that some kind of direct popular legislation may 
possible within the framework of county assemblies (Elek Fényes20), or at 
least to instruct and recall representatives (Kálmán Tisza21).22 These plans 
were, however, definitely upset by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 
1867, which led to a dual monarchy: two countries ruled by the same 
emperor,  a  common  army,  mutual  foreign  policy  and  shared  finances 
relating to them.
In  the  times  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  dual  monarchy  the  questions  of 
direct democracy were not addressed in an in-depth manner. Only the 
Hungarian Social Democratic Party formed a political claim on its congress 
in 1903, when it  included in its program – presumably inspired by the 
Social  Democratic  Party  of  Germany23 –  “the  direct  legislation  of  the 
people manifested in their right to initiate and to ››throw out‹‹ laws”.24
18 Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), lawyer, journalist and politician; in 1849 Regent-President 
of Hungary. In 1849, after the defeat of the Hungarian War of Independence, he emigrated 
to Turkey, from 1861 to Italy. 
19 Cf. the subsequent translation of the original French version into Hungarian by Lajos 
Kossuth (with additions) cap. III-IV. György Spira, Kossuth és alkotmányterve, Debrecen, 
Csokonai, 1989, pp. 49-83, especially pp. 8, 57, 59, 62-64.
20 Elek Fényes (1807-1876), economic and geographical writer, leading figure of Hungarian 
economic statistics, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
21 Kálmán Tisza (1830-1902), Hungarian prime minister betwen 1875 and 1890.
22 Stipta, Kísérlet…, pp. 121-122.
23 The  Social  Democratic  Workers’  Party’s  Eisenach  Program,  III.  2.:  “Einführung  der 
direkten Gesetzgebung (das  heißt  Vorschlags-  und Verwerfungsrecht)  durch das Volk.” 
Wilhelm Mommsen (ed.),  Deutsche Parteiprogramme, 2nd ed., München, Olzog, 1964, p. 
312. The similarity was mentioned also by Szentpéteri, A közvetlen demokrácia…, p. 363.
24 Program  of  the  Hungarian  Social  Democratic  Party,  1903,  item  2.  A  Magyar 
Munkásmozgalom  Történetének  Válogatott  Dokumentumai,  vol.  3, A  magyar 
munkásmozgalom a 20. század első éveiben és az 1905-1907-es forradalmi válság idején,  
1900-1907, Budapest, Szikra, 1955, p. 140. For its explanation see: Sándor Csizmadia, 
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3.3. OSZKÁR JÁSZI AND THE IDEA OF AN “EASTERN SWITZERLAND”  IN THE DANUBIAN BASIN 
(1918); THE SOPRON PLEBISCITE OF 1921
The demand for referendums arose in special circumstances at the end of 
the First  World  War in  1918 with the Károlyi  Government coming into 
office  after  the  so-called  October  Revolution.  Oszkár  Jászi,25 who  was 
entrusted with the preparation of the autonomy of national minorities in 
Hungary, intended to form a cantonal system based on the Swiss model in 
Hungary (the idea was called “Eastern Switzerland”) which – on the one 
hand – could have kept the integrity of the state territory and – on the 
other  hand – would have established autonomous regions for different 
national  minorities.  He  also  declared  in  advance  to  accept  a  possible 
decision  of  the  Peace  Conference  about  holding  referendums  where 
Slovaks,  Romanians,  Serbs  and  Ruthenians  who  live  in  Hungary  can 
decide which country they wish to belong to.26 However, these concepts 
were refused by the leaders of the national minorities who strove at that 
time to establish their own nation-states, rather than for autonomy inside 
of  Hungary.  The  idea  to  resolve  territorial  and  border  issues  by 
referendums was adopted in  1920 by the Hungarian delegation to the 
Versailles Peace Conference as well,27 but the plan failed again because 
the Allied Powers did not support this concept.
It came to a referendum only once in this era: in the case of Sopron and 
its  surroundings,  a  region  next  to  the  Austrian-Hungarian  border,  in 
December 1921. The Treaty of Saint-Germain awarded a territory of 4500 
square  kilometres  with  350 000  inhabitants  to  Austria  which  originally 
belonged to Hungary. It was later called Burgenland because of the word 
“Burg”  in  the  names  of  concerned  counties  (Wieselburg  –  Moson, 
Ödenburg – Sopron, Eisenburg – Vas). However, on the day appointed for 
yielding  the  territory  (the  28th August,  1921),  different  revolting  and 
armed groups – partly sent by the Hungarian Government, partly formed 
spontaneously but tolerated by the state – demonstrated resistance and 
Mit  akarunk?  A  Magyarországi  Szociáldemokrata  Párt  programmjának  magyarázata,  
Budapest, Népszava, 1903, p. 32. Quoted also by Szentpéteri, A közvetlen demokrácia…, 
pp. 367-368. fn. 57.
25 Oszkár  Jászi  (1875-1957),  Hungarian  social  scientist,  historian  and  politician;  from 
October  until  December  1918  Minister  of  Nationalities.  In  1919,  he  emigrated  from 
Hungary to Vienna, in 1925 to the USA.
26 See the “short catechism” summarizing the principles and ideas of the ministry: László 
Domokos, Kis  káté  a  Magyarországon  élő  nemzetek  önrendelkezési  jogáról,  Budapest, 
Lantos,  1919, pp.  12-13.  Quoted also  by László  Szarka,  Duna-táji  dilemmák.  Nemzeti 
kisebbségek – kisebbségi politika a 20. századi Kelet-Közép-Európában,  Budapest, Ister, 
1998, p. 122.
27 See  e.g.  the  speech  of  Albert  Apponyi,  leader  of  the  Hungarian  delegation  to  the 
Versailles Peace Conference (16th January, 1920) and his remarks on the peace conditions 
(12th February, 1920), in Béla Pomogáts, Magda Ádám, Győző Cholnoky (eds.), Trianon. A 
magyar békeküldöttség tevékenysége 1920-ban, Budapest, Lucidus, 2000, pp. 227, 359-
362.
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held  their  position  for  several  days  in  battle,  hindering  the  Austrian 
gendarmerie  from marching  though the territory  still  controlled  by the 
Hungarian  Government.  Finally,  by  the  mediation  of  Italy,  it  came  to 
negotiations in Venice between István Bethlen Hungarian prime minister 
and Johannes Schober Austrian chancellor, where the parties agreed to 
clear the region from insurgents and to arrange a referendum about the 
future of Sopron and its environs (a part of Burgenland). The ballot was 
held between the 14th and 16th December with a significant participation, 
where 65% of the inhabitants voted for Hungary, and 35% cast their vote 
for  Austria.  Sopron  and  eight  villages  in  its  surroundings  therefore 
remained a part of Hungary and the Parliament commemorated the noble 
act by means of law by inserting the following phrase into the coat of 
arms of the town: “civitas fidelissima” (“the most loyal town”).28
4. Socialist era
Paradoxically, the first law which enacted the possibility of referendums in 
Hungary – similar to that of the 1936 Soviet Constitution29 – was the 1949 
socialist Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic. It states that the 
Presidential Council – an organ substituting the Parliament, endowed with 
legislative power as well – was entitled to call a referendum in questions 
of  national  importance.30 The  regulation  didn’t  contain  any  rules  on 
admitted  and  excluded  subject  matters,  nor  on  the  procedure  itself. 
Therefore, this article of the Constitution remained a dead letter: during 
the  socialist  period  –  except  the  so-called  “Four-Yes”  referendum just 
before the first free election in 1989 – not a single national referendum 
was held in Hungary. However, on local level the law on local councils 
enabled to hold explanatory, consultative referendums in the course of so-
called  village  meetings.  Consequently,  the  local  authority  could  raise 
questions of common importance before the village meeting in order to 
inform the local inhabitants and to get acquainted with their opinion. In 
communes with joint council31 it was prescribed to call the village meeting 
to discuss the council’s report on its work.32. According to the decree on 
the  implementation  of  the  law,  the  council  was  to  inquire  about  the 
people’s opinion regarding the medium-term plan of the commune, about 
its  general  resettlement  plan  or  any  other  significant  plans  and  their 
28 Act  XXIX  of  1922.  For  the  antecedents,  circumstances  and  course  of  the  Sopron 
referendum see: Mária Ormos,  Civitas fidelissima. Népszavazás Sopronban 1921, Győr, 
Gordiusz, 1990.
29 1936 Soviet Constitution (adopted on the 5th December), art. 49: “The Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.: d) conducts referendums on its own initiative or on the 
demand of one of the Union Republics…”
30 Act XX of 1949 art. 20, section 1: “The Presidential Council: d) may order referendums 
in questions of national importance…”
31 Two communes situated next to each other had the possibility to establish a common 
administrative organisation in order to use local resources on a more effective way.
32 From 1984 in other communes without joint council, were included as well.
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execution  as  well  as  other  important  issues.33 As  stated,  these 
consultative  village  meetings  took  place  with  considerable  interest,34 
although the opinion expressed by the inhabitants wasn’t binding for the 
council.  From 1984  the  decree  also  prescribed,  that  drafts  of  council 
decrees  affecting  a  larger  part  of  the  inhabitants  shall  be  opened  for 
public  discussion and the council  shall  be informed about  the opinions 
expressed  there.35 However,  these  public  discussions  didn’t  function  in 
practice.36 It was first decreed in 1987 by a directive of the central leading 
body  of  local  councils,  by  the  President  of  the  Government’s  Council 
Office, that the opinion expressed on village meetings is obligatory for the 
council. The directive tried to lay down detailed rules as well.37
As for popular rights, another interesting element of Hungarian socialist 
constitutional law was the institution of recall. The Constitution of 1949 
ordered namely – as did its model, the Stalin Constitution of 193638 – that 
both parliamentary representatives and members of local councils can be 
recalled by the voters according to the detailed regulation of  a special 
law.39 As for the members of local councils the question was first regulated 
in detail in 1954,40 including parliamentary representatives only from the 
year  1966.41 Voters  could  therefore  recall  the  representative  if  he/she 
could not fulfil the mandate or became unworthy of it. According to the 
law, it was the competent institution of the Patriotic Popular Front (a mass 
organisation  controlled  by  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers’  Party  in 
reality),  who  was  entitled  to  propose  a  recall  process.  The  circle  of 
initiators  was  expanded  by  the  law  on  elections  in  1985:  in  case  of 
representatives were elected it empowered 10% of the inhabitants in the 
33 Art. 35. of Act I of 1971 on Local Councils and art. 33. of Governmental Decree no. 
11/1971. (III. 31.) on the implementation of the act.
34 Pál  Kara,  György  Wiener,  “A  népszavazás  bevezetésének  lehetősége  a  helyi 
tanácsoknál”, Jogtudományi Közlöny, vol. 41, 1986/5, p. 229.
35 Regulation of the art. 32. sec. (2) of the Governmental Decree no. 11/1971. (III. 31.), 
which was implemented by art. 14. of the Cabinet Decree no. 50/1983. (XII. 28.).
36 Kara, Wiener, op. cit., ibid.
37 Directive no. 7007/1987. (TK. 22.) of the President of the Council Office of the cabinet 
on local ballot. Quoted by István Szentpéteri, “A közvetlen demokrácia elméleti alapjai és 
intézményei”,  in  Márta  Katonáné Soltész  (ed.),  Az emberi  jogok hazánkban,  Budapest, 
Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Jogi Továbbképző Intézet – Kutató Csoport, 1988, pp. 
255-256.
38 1936 Soviet Constitution (adopted on the 5th December), art. 142.:  “It is the duty of 
every deputy to report  to his  electors on his  work  and on the  work  of  the Soviet  of  
Working People’  Deputies,  and he is  liable  to  be  recalled  at  any  time  in  the  manner 
established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors.”
39 Act XX of 1949 art. 30. sec. 3.: “Members of local councils may be recalled by citizens of  
the district according to law.” Art. 62. sec. 3.:  “Voters can recall elected parliamentary 
representatives.” Art. 66.: “A special law shall be enacted on the detailed rules concerning 
the recall of parliamentary representatives.”
40 Act IX of 1954 on the Election of Local Councils art. 1. sec. (3), art. 53-54.
41 Act III of 1966 on the Election of Parliamentary Members and Members of Local Councils 
art. 1. sec. (3), art. 58-59. The recall of members of the county and metropolitan councils 
was regulated by art. 1. sec. (4) and art. 65. of the Act III of 1970.
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local districts to initiate a recall.42 The citizens had to vote openly until 
1985, from that year on voters could vote privately, given a minimum 
50% participation rate and a majority decision.43 However, it hardly ever 
came to recall processes, except for the last days of the socialist system. 
At that time, at the turn of the year 1988 to 1989, organisations of the 
opposition,  the  Federation  of  Young  Democrats  and  the  Hungarian 
Democratic Forum initiated – collecting enough signatures within a short 
period  of  time  –  the  recall  of  about  two  dozens  of  parliamentary 
representatives. The most of them resigned before the day of the ballot, 
their places were taken by representatives of the opposition.
5.  The  “breakthrough”:  regulation  and  practice  of  direct 
democratic institutions on national level 1989-1997
5.1. REASONS FOR INTRODUCING DIRECT DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
The  demand  for  a  detailed  regulation  on  referendums  and  popular 
initiatives especially emerged with a great power in the last days of the 
party  state.  The  question  of  settlement  development  contribution  is 
usually  referred to here as an immediate provoking factor:  from 1986 
local councils had the right to impose this kind of tax but according to law 
the prior consent of inhabitants was needed, and it was also necessary to 
inquire about their opinion regarding the purposes to be achieved and the 
amount and duration of the contribution that was to be collected.44 This 
made the  regulation  of  referendums necessary  on  the  local  level.  The 
struggle  of  associate  communes  to  become  independent  by  means  of 
referendum appeared too on local level. The question of referendums on 
national level was raised by different environmental movements in 1988, 
especially  by protests against  the planned Bős-Nagymaros dam on the 
Danube.  The  construction  of  the  dam  would  have  led  to  serious 
environmental  damages;  therefore,  environmentalist  groups  started  – 
despite the lack of detailed regulation – a campaigning for signatures in 
order to put the dam construction issue on referendum.45
42 Act III of 1983 on the election of parliamentary members and members of local councils 
art. 15. sec. (2), art. 74-75., art. 85. After the proposition of the Patriotic Popular Front 
the Parliament was entitled to decide on the recall of parliamentary deputies elected from 
lists, see: art. 15. sec. (4).
43 For the recall see: Ottó Bihari, “Összeférhetetlenség, visszahívás”,  Állam és Igazgatás, 
vol.  21,  1971/12.  pp.  1070-1082.;  Márta  Dezső,  “Jelölés  és  visszahívás  a  szocialista 
országok  választási  rendszerében”,  Jogtudományi  Közlöny,  vol.  36,  1981/10.  pp.  832-
841., especially pp. 834-835.; István Szentpéteri, “A közvetlen demokrácia elméleti alapjai 
és  intézményei”  op.  cit.,  p.  254.;  István  Kukorelli,  “Állampolgári  részvétel  a 
választásokban”, in Márta Katonáné Soltész (ed.), Az emberi jogok hazánkban, Budapest, 
Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Jogi Továbbképző Intézet – Kutató Csoport, 1988, pp. 
241-242.
44 Law decree no. 12 of 1984 on settlement development contribution, art. 1.
45 For  the  reasons  of  introducing  referendum  see:  István  Kukorelli,  “A  közvetlen 
demokrácia  „visszafejlesztésének”  irányai”,  in  Károly  Tóth  (ed.),  Emlékkönyv  Dr. 
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The first detailed law on referendum and popular initiative was therefore 
adopted by the last Parliament of the party-state in 1989, not long before 
the first free elections.46 Only after that did the overall  revision of the 
Constitution  come  into  force,  which  transformed  Hungary  into  a 
democratic  republic.  The “new” Constitution contained only one rule of 
competence concerning referendums (the Parliament was entitled to order 
a national referendum; the regulation of referendums was subject to a 
two-third majority  vote of  the Parliament)  and the President’s right to 
propose national referendums.47 Interestingly, the new law made it easy 
to  initiate  a  referendum: the President,  the Government,  at  least  fifty 
parliamentary representatives or fifty thousand citizens had the right to 
propose  a  referendum.  In  local  councils  3%  of  the  inhabitants  were 
entitled to initiate a referendum.48 On national level, in case the initiative 
came from one hundred thousand citizens the Parliament was obliged to 
order  the  referendum.49 Not  many  subjects  were  excluded:  some 
regulations concerning state  finance, questions of  appointments by the 
Parliament, international obligations which had already been undertaken. 
However, the conditions of a valid and successful referendum were strict: 
valid votes of more than half of all the citizens and the same answer of 
the majority of the votes were required. At least ten thousand signatures 
were needed for a national agenda initiative in order to ask the Parliament 
Szentpéteri  István  egyetemi  tanár  születésének  70.  évfordulójára.  Acta  Universitatis 
Szegediensis de Attila József Nominatae, Acta Juridica et Politica, Szeged, vol. 49, fasc. 1-
48, 1996, pp. 315-316.; idem “Az országos népszavazás, 1989-1998”, in Sándor Kurtán, 
Péter  Sándor,  László  Vass  (eds.),  Magyarország  évtizedkönyve  1988-1998,  Budapest, 
Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 1998, p. 468.; Márta Dezső, András 
Bragyova,  “Hungary”,  in  Andreas  Auer,  Michael  Bützer  (eds.),  Direct  Democracy.  The 
Eastern and Central European Experience, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, pp. 64-66. – see it 
also  as  part  of  the  C2D  Working  Papers  Series  (7/2000)  at 
http://www.c2d.ch/files/C2D_WP7.pdf.
46 Act XVII of 1989 on Referendum and Popular Initiative.
47 Act XX of 1949 art. 19. sec. (5), art. 30/A. sec. (1) item g). Art 2. of Act I of 1989 
entitled – instead of the Presidential Council – the Parliament to order a referendum. The 
right  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  propose  a  referendum was enacted into  the 
Constitution by art. 16. of Act XXXI of 1989.
48 Henceforth,  I  don’t  deal with local  level regulation and practice of referendums. For 
further details see Márta Dezső, András Bragyova, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
49 In Hungarian usage, a referendum is called “compulsory (or mandatory) referendum” if 
it  was initiated by a certain  number of  voters (from 1989 by 100.000,  since 1998 by 
200.000 voters) and not  by reason of  a  legal  regulation which orders referendum for 
specific  matters.  If  the  required  number  of  signatures  is  collected,  the  Parliament  is 
obliged to order the referendum. Therefore, “compulsory (mandatory) referendums” are 
practically consequences of  popular initiatives. However, the term “popular initiative” is 
used  in  Hungarian  terminology  only  for  agenda  initiatives.  The  term  “facultative 
referendum” indicates in Hungarian terminology a referendum which was initiated by less 
voters than prescribed for compulsory (mandatory) referendums (from 1989 by at least 
50.000 voters,  since 1998 by at  least  100.000 voters)  or by state  organs (President, 
Government or a certain number of parliamentary representatives). In these cases, the 
Parliament is authorized to decide whether to order the referendum or not.
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to discuss a question falling in its competence; however in the case of fifty 
thousand signatures the Parliament had to debate the subject.50
5.2. REFERENDUMS AND REJECTED INITIATIVES FROM 1989 UNTIL 1997; DECISION 2/1993. 
(I. 22.) OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
A number  of  national  referendums were  held  in  Hungary  under  these 
regulations.  The  first  was  the  so-called  “Four-Yes”  referendum  in 
November 1989, before the first free elections.51 Since June 1989, the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the parties and organisations of 
the opposition had been discussing the main questions of the democratic 
transition  in  scope  of  the  so-called  “National  Round Table  Talks”.  The 
Hungarian  Socialist  Workers’  Party insisted  on  its  own  scenario:  the 
President  shall  be  elected  first,  directly  by  the  people,  the  first  free 
parliamentary  elections  may  come  only  after.  The  governing  forces 
pressed for a presidential system, because their candidate, the reform-
communist leader Imre Pozsgay was popular and didn’t have an apt rival 
in  the  opposition  at  that  time.  In  turn  they  offered  to  dissolve  the 
Workers’  Militia  if  the  candidacy  of  Pozsgay  were  accepted  by  the 
opposition.  Some organisations  of  the  opposition  –  amongst  them the 
most influential, the Hungarian Democratic Forum – tended to accept the 
offer.  However,  the  Alliance  of  the  Free  Democrats  and  three  other 
oppositional  parties52 started  to  collect  signatures  in  order  to  put  on 
referendum the question of the President’s election, the dissolution of the 
Workers’  Militia  and two other  claims  the  Hungarian Socialist  Workers’ 
Party was unwilling to meet: the withdrawal of the  Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party’s organisations from workplaces and the Party’s accounting 
for  its  assets.  The  governing  forces  tried  to  defeat  the  initiative:  the 
Parliament quickly adopted rules on the dissolution of the Workers’ Militia 
and on the prohibition of party organisations at workplaces. The problem 
of the  Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party’s accountability was also been 
solved.53 But  the  initiators  very  quickly  collected  –  about  140 000 
signatures within one month and the Parliament didn’t dare to stop the 
process. Although the Hungarian Democratic Forum decided to boycott the 
referendum, it was successful with a turnout of 58%. The four initiatives 
of the Free Democrats were approved; the President was elected by the 
new multi-party Parliament in August 1990.54 The referendum went a long 
50 The synoptic table of popular rights in the system of the 1989 Referendum Act and the 
steps of the procedure in case of a bottom up initiative are shown in Annex II.
51 For  the  background and the  way to  the  referendum see:  Kis,  János:  “1989:  A  víg 
esztendő”, Beszélő, October 1999.
52 Federation  of  Young  Democrats,  Independent  Smallholder’s  Party,  Hungarian  Social 
Democratic Party.
53 Act XXX of 1989 on the Dissolution of the Workers’ Militia; Act XXXIII of 1989 on the 
Operation and Financial Management of Political Parties, art. 2. and 16.
54 See the list of Hungarian national referendums since 1989 with the questions, turnout 
and other data in Annex IV.
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way to  make the  main  initiator,  the  Alliance  of  Free  Democrats  more 
popular before the general elections.
The  success  of  the  referendum  was  not  enough  to  help  the  Free 
Democrats to win the first free election (they got the second place after 
the Hungarian  Democratic  Forum and became the  biggest  oppositional 
party), but it showed clearly how unpopular the governing forces were. In 
April  1990, the Hungarian Socialist  Party – actually  a successor of the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party – got only a scarce 9% of the seats in 
the new Parliament. In order to escape political isolation they supported 
the  initiative  of  the  independent  parliamentary  representative  Zoltán 
Király  to  put  the  question  of  the  President’s  direct  election  on  the 
referendum again. The socialists could collect the prescribed amount of 
signatures very quickly, however – in the middle of summer – the turnout 
was low (only 14%) and the referendum for this reason was invalid.55
At the end of  1992,  the Association of  Citizens under the Subsistence 
Minimum  Level56 planned  to  dissolve  the  Parliament  by  means  of 
referendum,  but  the  Parliament  asked  the  prior  opinion  of  the 
Constitutional  Court.  The  Court  in  response  pronounced  that  the 
Parliament could not be forced to dissolve, because it would be considered 
a common recall  (not allowed by the Constitution).  The Court declared 
further  that  referendums  in  the  parliamentary  system  shall  be 
complementary in relation to representative exercise of power, moreover, 
a question put on referendum can’t involve an implied modification of the 
Constitution. It also called the attention of the Parliament to the fact that 
the rules of the law on referendum adopted before the new Constitution in 
1989 concerning the subject matters of referendum are not compatible 
55 For  the overview of  referendums in  the  nineties  see: István Kukorelli,  “A  közvetlen 
demokrácia  „visszafejlesztésének”  irányai”  op.  cit.  pp.  316-320.;  idem “Az  országos 
népszavazás, 1989-1998” op. cit., pp. 471-476.; idem “Az országos népszavazás helye a 
parlamenti  demokráciában”,  in Sándor Mikolasek (ed.),  A magyar alkotmányosság ezer 
éve.  Tudományos  konferencia  Esztergom  1998.  november  17., Esztergom,  Esztergom 
Város Önkormányzata, 1998, pp. 39-41.; György Szoboszlai, “A népszavazás alkotmányos 
helye és a politika. A politikai osztály találkozásai a közvetlen demokráciával, 1989-1997”, 
in  Sándor  Kurtán,  Péter  Sándor,  László  Vass  (eds.),  Magyarország  politikai  évkönyve 
1997-ről, Budapest, Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 1998, pp. 103-
121.;  Mónika  Gulyás,  “A  népszavazás  intézménye  –  történeti-összehasonlító 
perspektívában”,  Politikatudományi Szemle, vol. 4, 1999/4, pp. 120-125. For the period 
until  1995  see  further:  Péter  Szigeti,  “Tendenciák  Magyarországon  a  parlamentáris 
jogállam  kialakulásától  napjainkig.  Pártrendszer,  tulajdonviszonyok,  a  közvetlen 
demokratikus  részvétel  és  összefüggéseik”,  in  Tamás  Krausz  (ed.),  Rendszerváltás  és 
társadalomkritika.  Tanulmányok  a  kelet-európai  átalakulás  történetéből,  Budapest, 
Napvilág Kiadó, 1998, p. 239 ff.; beside the regulation and practice touching upon the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court as well: Márta Dezső, András Bragyova, op. cit., pp. 
63-93. The more than 100 thousand of signatures collected by the Council for Conciliation 
of Social Interests in 1991 in order to repeal the law on compensation were finally not 
presented to the Parliament; neither the signatures collected by Fiksz Association in 1992 
in order to maintain the regulation on abortion, cf. Mónika Gulyás, op. cit. p. 121.
56 A civic  organization aiming at  safeguarding the  interests  of  people  living  below the 
poverty line.
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with the new regulation based on the separation of  powers,  thus,  the 
Parliament has to harmonise the law with the Constitution.57
The  Court  set  a  deadline  at  the  end  of  1993,  but  it  didn’t  come  to 
harmonisation  until  1998.  During  this  time  however,  the  Parliament 
refused an initiative in 1995 about the direct election of the President of 
the Republic, about the extension of his competence and other questions 
raised by the Independent Smallholder’s Party with two hundred thousand 
signatures. The Parliament referred to the decision of the Constitutional 
Court mentioned above, namely: the question involves a modification of 
the Constitution.58 In the same year, the extra-parliamentary Hungarian 
Communist Workers’ Party proposed a referendum with more than one 
hundred thousand signatures about the NATO accession of Hungary, but 
this initiative was refused by the Parliament as well – without any legal 
reasoning – under  pretext:  the question is  not  timely.59 In  reality  the 
parliamentary  parties  were  afraid  of  a  possible  negative  result  (and 
perhaps also of the strengthening of the Workers’ Party).60
6. Regulation and practice of popular rights on national level 
since 1997
6.1. REVISED LEGAL FRAMEWORK; DECISION 52/1997. (X. 14.)  OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT
The amendment of the Constitution concerning the rules of referendum 
came  into  effect  in  the  summer  of  1997.61 According  to  the  new 
regulation,62 the number of signatures required for a binding referendum 
by popular initiative had increased to two hundred thousand; a facultative 
referendum – where the Parliament may deliberate whether to put the 
question  on  ballot  or  not  –  can  be  initiated  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic, the Government, by one-third of the members of the Parliament 
57 Decision 2/1993. (I. 22.) of the Constitutional Court. With comparative considerations 
for the alteration of the act see: Márta Dezső, “A népszavazás szabályozásához”, Magyar 
Közigazgatás,  vol.  43,  1993/7,  pp.  399-402.  See  the  list  of  the  most  important 
Constitutional Court’s decisions concerning referendums in Annex V.
58 Parliamentary  Resolution  54/1995.  (V.  26.).  In  case  of  the  popular  initiative  for 
organising  the  world  exhibition  “EXPO 1996”,  which  was  supported  by  parties  of  the 
opposition,  were  not  collected  enough  signatures  and  the  Parliament  didn’t  put  the 
question on the agenda.
59 Parliamentary Resolution 120/1995. (XII. 22.).
60 For  the analysis  of  the  circumstances  and of  the unfavourable  decision see: Tamás 
Csapody, “Egy népszavazási kísérlet jogszerűsége”,  Társadalmi Szemle, 1996/6, pp. 40-
47. The Workers’ Party took recourse to the Constitutional Court, but the Court declared a 
lack of jurisdiction. Cf. Decision 3/1996. (II. 23.) of the Constitutional Court.
61 Act LIX of 1997 on the Amendment of the Constitution, art. 2-4.
62 The synoptic table of popular rights in the system of the 1997 constitutional amendment 
and the steps of the procedure in case of a bottom up initiative according to Act III of 
1998 on Referendum and Popular Initiative and to Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure are 
shown in Annex III.
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or by one hundred thousand citizens. The amendment added elements to 
the list of subject matters excluded from referendums as well. A national 
referendum may not be held (a) on the statutes concerning State Budget 
and its implementation, central taxes, stamp and customs duties, as well 
as on the content of statutes concerning uniform requirements on local 
taxes; (b) on the obligations arising from international treaties in force 
and on the content of the laws containing these obligations; (c) on the 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  on  national  referenda  and  popular 
initiatives;  (d)  on  personal  issues,  and  on  questions  concerning  the 
establishment (restructuring, dissolution) of organizations that fall within 
the  competence  of  the  Parliament;  (e)  on  the  dissolution  of  the 
Parliament; (f) on the program of the Government; (g) on the declaration 
of a state of war, state of national crisis or state of emergency; (h) on the 
use of the Hungarian Defence Forces abroad or within the country; (i) on 
the dissolution of the representative body of the local government; (j) on 
the exercise of general amnesty.
However,  according  to  constitutional  amendment,  the  threshold  was 
reduced: it was no longer required that the participation rate and valid 
votes exceed 50% of the eligible voters, it was enough for more than a 
half of the voters, but at least more than one-quarter of all eligible voters 
to give the same answer in the referendum. In autumn of the same year it 
was enacted in the Constitution as well, that in order to call a national 
referendum, signatures may be collected for a period of four months, in 
case of a national agenda initiative for a period of two months.63
After this,  still  in  1997, the opposition initiated a referendum with the 
required  amount  of  signatures  in  order  to  prohibit  foreigners  from 
acquiring  agricultural  land  in  Hungary.  The  Government  intended  to 
prevent  this,  so,  it  proposed – without collecting signatures – another 
question for facultative referendum on this issue. The Parliament accepted 
the questions of the Government and ordered the referendum.64 On the 
complaint  of  the  opposition  and  the  ombudsman  for  civil  rights  the 
Constitutional  Court  stated  in  general  –  without  examination  of  the 
concrete  questions  proposed –  that  a  popular  initiative  –  launched by 
enough signatures for a decisive referendum – shall take priority against 
the Government’s facultative proposition. The Court declared further, that 
although the direct exercise of popular sovereignty is exceptional, in such 
cases however it supersedes representative power. In case of a binding 
referendum by popular  initiative  the  Parliament  is  forced  to  adopt  the 
relevant  law.65 Finally,  the  Parliament  rejected  the  question  of  the 
opposition  concerning  the  acquisition  of  agricultural  land  of  foreigners, 
reasoning,  that  the  wording  of  the  question  itself  is  not  unambiguous 
enough and the result  of  the referendum may contrast with Hungary’s 
63 Act XCVIII of 1997 on the Amendment of the Constitution, art. 4.
64 Parliamentary Resolution 86/1997. (X. 8.).
65 Decision 52/1997. (X. 14.) of the Constitutional Court. For its analysis see: Péter Szigeti, 
“Népszavazási  dosszié.  Rekonstrukció  és  analízis  az  Alkotmánybíróság  döntése  után”, 
Társadalmi Szemle, vol. 53, 1998/2, pp. 88-92.
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international  obligations.66 Thus  there  was  no  referendum  about  the 
question.
The  decision  of  the  Constitutional  Court  however  contained  more 
important  directions  concerning  the  new  law  about  referendum  in 
preparation,  which  was  finally  enacted  in  1998.67 It  empowered  the 
National  Election  Committee  to  control  the  incoming  questions  for 
referendum or popular initiative in advance from a legal aspect, and – for 
reasons laid down by law – to refuse the validation of the signature sheet. 
Everyone has the right to remonstrate upon the decision of the Committee 
and to take recourse to the Constitutional Court, who in turn is entitled to 
repeal it.68 At the end of 2007 the Parliament adopted another important 
rule:  a  resolution  taken  by  a  successful  national  referendum held  for 
reaching a decision shall by binding upon the Parliament for a period of 
three years  during which the Parliament cannot  adopt a new law that 
contradicts the decision made by referendum three years before.69
6.2.  NATIONAL REFERENDUMS IN 1997,  2003,  2004  AND 2008;  FURTHER IMPORTANT 
DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
In  November  1997  it  came to  the  referendum about  Hungary’s  NATO 
accession,  which  was  successful  due  to  the  lowering  of  the  validity 
threshold two weeks before. The relatively low turnout (49%) is perhaps 
explainable by the fact that all of the parliamentary parties had been in 
favour of the accession since 1991, they made it appear as a choice which 
hasn’t  any  alternative  (the  question  itself  was  also  quite  suggestive), 
therefore the people felt that the question has been already decided. The 
few  opponents – two radical extra-parliamentary parties: the  Hungarian 
Justice  and Life  Party  and the Hungarian Communist  Workers’  Party – 
couldn’t increase the stake by mobilizing more supporters.
Further  referendum initiatives  in  1998  were  refused  by  the  National 
Election  Committee  with  correct  legal  reasons  or  lacking  enough 
signatures;  the questions  concerned the construction of  a dam on the 
Danube,  re-establishing  public  ownership  of  the  parties’  estates, 
reintroducing  capital  punishment.  Subsequently  the  Social  Democratic 
Youth  League proposed a  referendum about  the  direct  election  of  the 
President of the Republic. Since the question was not included in the new 
list of subjects prohibited by the amended rules of the Constitution, the 
National  Election  Committee  validated  the  signature-collection  sheet. 
However, the Constitutional  Court – referring to the Constitution which 
assigns the legislation to the Parliament – declared, that no referendum 
may  be  held  upon  the  initiation  of  citizens  about  the  question  of  a 
66 Parliamentary Resolution 23/1998. (III. 11.).
67 Act III of 1998 on Referendum and Popular Initiative.
68 Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure, art. 130.
69 Act CLXXII of 2007, art. 9.; Act III of 1998, art. 8. sec. (1).
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constitutional modification, it is only permitted to affirm an amendment 
already adopted by the Parliament by means of referendum.70
In 2001, the Constitutional Court came to another important decision in 
connection with a popular initiative on the revision of the Labour Code: 
the  Court  expounded  the  requirements  concerning  the  unanimity  of  a 
question put on referendum. The question must be unambiguous from two 
perspectives: on the one hand the voters have to be able to answer it with 
“yes” or “no”,  it shall  be clear and open to one interpretation only; in 
addition to this the Parliament has to be able to decide, whether it  is 
obliged to adopt a law, and if so, the contents need to be defined.71
In 2003 a mandatory referendum was arranged,72 it addressed Hungary’s 
accession to the European Union. The question was decided positively with 
a  significant  majority  (83,76%)  but  with  a  participation  rate  of  only 
45,62%, lower than in case of the NATO-accession.
In 2004, the Constitutional Court came to an important decision again.73 
In  connection  with  an  initiative  concerning  the  prohibition  of  the 
privatisation  of  state-owned  health  care  institutions,  the  Court 
pronounced:  it  is  possible  that  a  “new circumstance”  arises  after  the 
validation process. “New circumstance” can be for e.g. a constitutional 
amendment or a new international treaty. In such a case – if a complaint 
is lodged at the Constitutional Court against the Parliament’s resolution 
concerning the ordering of the referendum – the Constitutional Court may 
reconsider  the  admissibility  of  the  question  which  has  already  been 
admitted  in  the  validation  process.  The  “new  circumstance”  argument 
eventually  became  an  essential  part  of  the  Constitutional  Court’s 
reasoning  for  the  rejection  of  a  question  in  such  cases  where  the 
Parliament – after the validation of the question – adopted a new law or a 
revision which meets the intention of the initiative.
In 2004, for the first time, a referendum initiated by a non-party civic 
organization  was  held.  This  referendum  about  the  citizenship  of 
Hungarians  living  in  other  countries  was   launched  by  the  World 
Federation of Hungarians. A second question was put on referendum too, 
on  the  initiative  of  the  extra-parliamentary  Hungarian  Communist 
Workers’  Party: it  concerned the keeping of  health institutions in state 
ownership.  Both  questions  led  to  heated  debates  on  the  Hungarian 
political stage.
The  problem of  Hungarians  living  in  the  Carpathian  Basin  beyond  the 
borders of the mother-country have been on the agenda since the middle 
of the nineties. There are about 2,5 million Hungarians living beyond the 
borders  of  present  day  Hungary  on  territories  that  were  ceded  as  a 
70 Decision  25/1999.  (VII.  7.)  of  the  Constitutional  Court.  For  its  criticism  see:  Géza 
Kilényi, “A képviseleti és a közvetlen demokrácia viszonya a magyar államszervezetben”, 
Magyar Közigazgatás, vol. 49, 1999/12, pp. 673-681.
71 Decision 52/2001. (XI. 29.) of the Constitutional Court.
72 The mandatory referendum on the EU-accession was prescribed in 2002 by art. 10. of 
Act LXI of 2002.
73 Decision 40/2004. (X. 27.) of the Constitutional Court.
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consequence  of  the  Peace  Treaty  of  Trianon  in  1920.74 In  2001,  the 
Parliament adopted the so-called Status Act which accorded some benefits 
to ethnic Hungarians abroad concerning matters of work, travel, education 
and health care in Hungary. However, the World Federation of Hungarians 
insisted  on a  closer  legal  link  between Hungary  and Hungarians  living 
outside the country. As the organisation couldn’t put through its ideas in 
Parliament,  it  started  to  collect  signatures  in  order  to  organise  a 
referendum on the citizenship of ethnic Hungarians abroad. During the 
collection of signatures the political parties were hesitant; they launched 
their campaign only when the Parliament ordered the referendum. The 
Government argued against, the opposition in favour of the initiative. At 
the end, the proposal got a close majority but the referendum was invalid 
because of the low turnout.  The result  was a great disappointment for 
Hungarians living outside of the mother-country; the Fidesz – Hungarian 
Civic Union, the main central right party of the opposition, promised to 
adopt a law on the citizenship of ethnic Hungarians abroad if the party 
gets a majority in the Parliament.75
The  other  question  of  the  referendum  concerned  the  privatization  of 
health care institutions. This was a vital topic of former political debates. 
As the Hungarian state-owned health insurance system has been showing 
a deficit  for years which was to be met by tax incomes, governments 
planned  to  draw  private  capital  into  the  operation  of  health  care 
institutions. The first law concerning the privatisation was repealed by the 
Constitutional  Court.  Thereafter  the  Parliament  adopted  a  second  act 
enabling  the  participation  of  private  capital  in  financing  hospitals.  In 
answer to this, the extra-parliamentary Hungarian Communist Workers’ 
Party initiated a referendum in order to prohibit the privatisation of state-
owned health care institutions. Even though this second regulation was 
also annulled by the Constitutional Court, the Workers’ Party continued to 
collect signatures and the Parliament had to order the referendum. Just as 
in the question of  citizenship where the Government took an opposing 
standpoint, the opposition argued in favour of the initiative. Finally, the 
initiative reached 65% but because of  the low turnout the case ended 
without success.
The next – and to this day the last – Hungarian national referendum, the 
so-called  “social”  or  “three-yes  referendum” was held  in  2008.  It  was 
initiated in 2006 by two parties of the opposition – the Fidesz – Hungarian 
Civic Union and the Christian Democratic People’s Party. Hungary was just 
over the first financial restrictions of the second Gyurcsány-Government 
74 1,5 millions in Transylvania in Romania, 0,5 million in Slovakia, approximately 300.000 
in  the  Serbian  Province  of  Vojvodina,  150.000  in  Sub-Carpathia  in  Ukraine  and  some 
thousands in Croatia, Slovenia and Austria.
75 After the 2010 parliamentary elections, the party – having a two-third majority in the 
new Parliament – adopted a revision of the law on citizenship which makes it now possible 
to become a Hungarian citizen without having any means of subsistence and residence in 
Hungary, if the applicant declares himself to be of Hungarian origin and proves knowledge 
of the Hungarian language (Act XLI of 2010 on the revision of the Act LV of 1993 on 
Hungarian Citizenship). The new law led to political conflict with Slovakia.
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and  after  the  public  broadcasting  of  Ferenc  Gyurcsány’s  confidential 
speech  in  Balatonőszöd,  in  which  the  prime  minister  acknowledged 
between members  of  the Parliament’s  socialist  faction,  that his  former 
Government “lied in the morning, at noon and at night” and kept secret 
their real plans before the elections in the spring of 2006. The leakage of 
the audio recording of the speech led to serious protests in Hungary. The 
two  initiators  originally  proposed  to  put  seven  questions  on  the 
referendum.  Four  of  them  were  stopped  by  the  National  Election 
Committee, but the Constitutional Court supervised the decisions in two 
questions  and ordered  the  Committee  to  conduct  new proceedings.  In 
October 2007 – one year after the first registration of their questions – 
the  parties  started  to  collect  signatures  in  three  questions  which  had 
already  been  let  through  by  both  the  Election  Committee  and  the 
Constitutional Court. Finally, in the spring of 2008, the referendum was 
held about three subjects: the abolition of the out-patient “visit fee”, the 
in-patient  hospital  care  per-diem  rate  and  finally  the  tuition  fee  at 
universities and other higher institutions of education. The three issues 
became a symbol of the Government’s policies. Viktor Orbán, the leader of 
the Fidesz declared the referendum to be a decision on the Government’s 
future.  In  the  end,  all  three  questions  were  a  great  success  for  the 
opposition (82-84% for the abolition) with a participation rate of more 
than 50%. However, the Government didn’t resign and as a result of the 
referendum, the governing coalition broke up and a minority government 
took over which wasn’t able to proceed with the planned reform program. 
The referendum divided the Hungarian public: some scholars considered it 
an attack against the constitutional basis of the Hungarian parliamentary 
democracy,76 others  regarded  it  as  a  possible  solution  for  Hungary’s 
political crisis.77
Since the end of the last  parliamentary cycle in 2010 – two questions 
were brought up by parties of the opposition and five by the governing 
party,78 but  the  Parliament  refused  them  as  being  non  mandatory 
initiatives. In addition to this, two other initiatives with enough signatures 
76 See e.g. János Kis: “A népszavazási versenyfutás”, Népszabadság, 10th November, 2007. 
Published  in  the Internet:  25th January,  2008  [http://www.nol.hu/archivum/archiv-
470810].
77 See  e.g.:  Tamás  Fricz:  “Kis  János  téved”,  Népszabadság,  29th November,  2007. 
Published  in  the  Internet:  25th January,  2008  [http://www.nol.hu/archivum/archiv-
473102].
78 On the part of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party and of Christian Democratic People’s Party: 
on the confirmation of the law on health insurance savings (before, the President of the 
Republic returned the draft to the Parliament for deliberation); on the annual examination 
of  property  growth  of  ministers,  under-secretaries  of  state  and  parliamentary 
representatives. The Hungarian Socialist Party proposed the following subjects: political 
parties shall get financial aid only from the budget and from private persons; refund of 
expenses  for  parliamentary  representatives  without  clearing  of  accounts  shall  be 
abolished;  membership  of  Parliament  and  mayoralty  shall  be  incompatible;  the  tax 
authority shall regularly check the property growth of specific public servants; other public 
officials holding a leading post shall also be checked regularly.
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were handed in on behalf of private individuals79 and they were accepted 
by the Parliament, however the Constitutional Court refused them, first of 
all because the Parliament adopted laws in the meantime that met the 
intention  of  the  initiatives.80 According  to  the  Constitutional  Court’s 
argumentation,  referendums  have  the  primary  purpose  to  oblige  the 
Parliament to adopt or abolish a law. As a secondary purpose may they 
have the intention to oblige the Parliament to abstain from enacting a law 
but  only  in  case  the  referendum  counteracts  the  Parliament’s  or  the 
Government’s  real  endeavour  for  legislation.  In  consequence,  the 
referendum – despite enough signatures – can’t be held if the Parliament 
complies with  the intention of  the initiative and adopts an appropriate 
revision. In this way the Parliament can also circumvent the rule, that the 
result of the referendum is binding for 3 years.
7. Concluding remarks
The history of referendums in Hungary – except the Sopron referendum in 
1921 – is visibly a history of the antecedents that runs all the way until 
the  political  transformation  in  1989/1990.  During  that  time,  Hungary 
didn’t belong to the pioneers of direct democracy. The political elite did 
not  favour  referendums,  direct  democratic  institutions  were  not 
considered  to  fit  into  the  Hungarian  constitutional  system.  The  1989 
Referendum  Act  was  a  real  breakthrough  although  only  six  national 
referendums were held (with twelve questions altogether); in this respect 
Hungary has only a limited experience with direct democracy.81 To sum up 
the most important lessons of the last twenty years of Hungarian direct 
democracy:
Firstly: Nationwide referendums had mostly – with only few exceptions – 
considerable consequences. The NATO and EU accession referendums in 
1997 and 2003 confirmed Hungary’s belonging to the Western European 
and North Atlantic economic and political community – a fact that – after 
45 years in the Soviet sphere of influence – can’t be overstressed. Both 
the so-called “Four-Yes Referendum” in 1989 and the “Social Referendum” 
in 2008 contributed to the modification of the Hungarian political map; the 
failure  of  the  2004  Citizenship  Referendum  influences  both  domestic 
politics and foreign affairs of Hungary to this day.
79 Zsolt  Albert and his  wife collected signatures against compulsory multi-player health 
insurance system; Mária Seres initiated a referendum on the question of whether members 
of Parliament should be compelled to present receipts in order to claim expenses.
80 Decisions 130/2008. (XI. 3.) and 472/H/2009. of the Constitutional Court.
81 Agenda initiatives doesn’t improve very much the experiences: between 1990 and 2009 
the  Parliament  decided about eleven agenda initiatives.  Ten of  them were put  on the 
agenda, but only two of them were accepted, the others were rejected. For information of 
agenda initiatives discussed by the Parliament see:
           http://www.parlament.hu/fotitkar/nepszav/nepszav.htm   (in Hungarian).
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Secondly: perhaps because of their considerable political consequences, in 
most  of  the  cases  successful  referendum initiatives  start  –  even if  by 
means  of  collecting  enough signatures  – on behalf  of  political  parties. 
They – especially in opposition – regard referendums as chance to reach 
their political purposes. The governing majority strove mostly to hinder 
parties of the opposition from pushing through initiatives, or at least to 
modify the question according to its own intentions.82
It is also clear that initiatives coming from civic organisations and from 
individuals or extra-parliamentary parties are hardly ever encouraged or 
even sabotaged by the parliamentary political elite. Only in 2004 did it 
come to referendums on the initiative of non-party organisations.
However, since the new Law on Referendums of 1998 the Parliament is no 
longer the most important filtering institution, this role now belongs to the 
National  Election  Committee  and  the  Constitutional  Court.  The  Court’s 
decisions impose more and more restrictions on referendum initiatives. In 
2008, the President of the Constitutional Court called the referendum a 
“dormant  mine”  which  exploded  in  2007/2008.  He  proposed  to  put 
reasonable  limits  on  the  institution  of  referendum:  the  possibility  to 
launch  initiatives  shouldn’t  be  open  to  everyone.83 It  must  be 
acknowledged:  in  the  last  years  the  number  of  referendum initiatives 
increased  significantly;  the  quality  of  initiatives  leaves  much  to  be 
desired.84
Therefore, it is uncertain today how the institutions of direct democracy 
will  be regulated in the new Constitution planned for 2012 by the new 
Hungarian Government.
82 For a summary of Hungarian referendum experiences until 1998 see: István Kukorelli, 
“Az országos népszavazás, 1989-1998” op. cit., p. 476.;  idem “Az országos népszavazás 
helye a parlamenti demokráciában” op. cit., pp. 41-42.; see further: Márta Dezső, András 
Bragyova, op. cit., pp. 81-90.
83 Emília  Krug:  “Szunnyadó  akna.  A  népszavazás  szellemét  nem az  Alkotmánybíróság 
szabadította ki a palackból. Paczolay Péter az alkotmányos aktivizmusról”, 168 Óra Online, 
4th July, 2008 [http://www.168ora.hu/cikk.php?cikk=21823].
84 Some proposed questions:  “Do you agree that guests of restaurants shouldn’t pay for 
beer?” [Decision 26/2007. (IV. 25.) of the Constitutional Court]; “Do you agree that the 
use of internet shall be gratis from the 1st January of next year?” [Decision 315/2008. (X. 
30.) of the National Election Committee]; “Do you agree to build monuments in honour of 
the  Christian,  Jewish,  Islamic,  Hindu,  Buddhistic  religions,  George  Washington  and 
Confucius at Freedom Square in Budapest?” [Decision 340/2008. (XI. 14.) of the National 
Election Committee];  “Do you agree that every cigarette-box shall be sold with a small 
booklet  which  shows ways  to  disuse  smoking?”  [Decision  357/2008.  (XII.  12.)  of  the 
National Election Committee]; “Do you agree to change Hungary’s form of government to 
Democratic  Kingdom and that  Hungary become a member of  the  Holy  King’s  People’s 
Community; do you accept Peter Svoren and the XVIth Dalai Lama as a king of the Holy 
King’s  People’s  Community?”  [Decision  11/2009.  (I.  9.)  of  the  National  Election 
Committee].
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Annexes
ANNEX I: POPULAR RIGHTS IN IGNÁC MARTINOVICS’S DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF AUGUST 1793 AND IN 
FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF 1792/93
Draft Constitution of Ignác 
Martinovics
French constitutional laws:
Cap. IV. art. XXII.:
   “Doch  muss  die  Konstitution  von  der 
ganzen  Nation  ausdrücklich,  und  alle 
Gesetze durch vordauerndes Stillschweigen 
von sechs Wochen angenommen werden.”
[mandatory constitutional referendum]
[popular veto on parliamentary statutes]
Cap. VI. art. XLII-XLIII:
   “Die  Urversammlungen bestehen  aus 
dem  König,  ganzem  Adel  und  allen 
Gemeinden des Volkes.”
   “Diese üben bloss die Haupthandlungen 
der  ursprünglichen  Souverainität  aus, 
nämlich  bestätigen  oder  verwerfen  den 
vom  Landtag  bestimmten 
Konstitutionsentwurf,  wählen  Deputierte 
zum  Landtag,  verwerfen  entworfene 
Gesetze,  wenn  diese  ihnen  schädlich 
scheinen,  erklären  ihren  Willen  über  die 
Höhe  der  Steuer,  und  über  einen  zu 
unternehmenden Krieg.”
[mandatory constitutional referendum]
[popular veto on parliamentary statutes]
Cap. VI. art. XLIV.:
   “Diese Urversammlungen geschehen auf 
folgende Art: [zuerst] der König gibt über 
diese Gegenstände seine Stimme allein…”
The  resolution  of  the  French  National 
Convention of the 21  st   of September, 1792: 
   “La Convention nationale déclare, 1° qu’il 
ne peut y avoir de constitution que celle qui 
est acceptée par le peuple…”
[mandatory constitutional referendum]
French  Constitution of the 24  th   of June, 1793, 
art. 115.:
   “Si, dans la moitié des départemens, plus 
un, le dixième des assemblées primaires de 
chacun  d’eux,  régulièrement  formées, 
demande  la  révision  de  l’acte 
constitutionnel,  ou  le  changement  de 
quelques-uns  de  ses  articles,  le  Corps-
Législatif  est tenu de convoquer toutes les 
assemblées primaires de la République, pour 
savoir  s’il  y  a  lieu  à  une  Convention 
nationale.”
[constitutional  referendum  (total  or 
partial revision)]
French  Constitution of the 24  th   of June, 1793, 
art. 58-60.:
   “Le projet est imprimé et envoyé à toutes 
les  communes  de  la  République,  sous  ce 
titre: Loi proposée.”
   “Quarante  jours  après  l’envoi  de  la  loi 
proposée,  si, dans  la  moitié  des 
départemens,  plus  un,  le  dixième  des 
assemblées  primaires  de  chacun  d’eux, 
régulièrement formées,  n’a pas réclamé, le 
projet est accepté, et devient loi.” 
   “S’il  y a réclamation,  le  Corps-Législatif 
convoque les assemblées primaires.”
[popular veto on parliamentary statutes]
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ANNEX II: POPULAR RIGHTS ACCORDING TO ACT XVII OF 1989 ON REFERENDUM AND POPULAR INITIATIVE AND THE STEPS OF THE PROCEDURE IN CASE OF BOTTOM UP 
INITIATIVES
Institution Aim
Type
(regarding 
binding force)
Triggering
(% of the 
electorate)
Possible issues in 
general Excluded issues
Require
d 
turnout
Mandatory 
constitutional 
referendum
decision binding
-
subsequent approval of a 
new constitution already 
adopted by Parliament
-
50%+1
Popular 
initiative85
(Must be held, 
Parliament 
shall order it)
100 000 voters
(ca. 1,25%)
issues  in  the  competence 
of the Parliament
• confirmation  of  acts 
passed by Parliament,
• decisions concerning  the 
passing of a bill,
• determining the principles 
of  the bill,  and issues of 
nation-wide  significance 
that  do not  require  a bill 
format
a) acts on the budget, the central tax 
types  and  stamp  duties,  on  the  central 
conditions for local taxes;
b) decisions  (appointments)  in 
personnel  issues  falling  under  the 
competence of Parliament;
c) the  completion  of  obligations 
accepted in international agreements, acts 
promulgating  these  agreements  (but  the 
confirmation  or  rejection  of  engaging  in 
future  obligations  arising  from 
international agreements or the extension 
of  expired  international  agreements  are 
not excluded).
Optional 
legislative 
referendum
(Parliament 
can deliberate 
whether to 
order it or not)
decision or 
expression of 
opinion
binding or 
consultative
President
Government
50 parliamentary 
representatives
50 000 voters
(ca. 0,625%)
Agenda 
initiative
(“compulsory”)
put a question 
on the agenda 
of the 
Parliament
Parliament shall 
debate it
50 000 voters
(ca. 0,625%) all issues whose decision 
lies in the Parliament’s field 
of competence
- -Agenda 
initiative
(“facultative”)
Parliament may 
decide whether to 
debate it or not
10 000 voters
(ca. 0,125%)
85 For the terminology, see above footnote 49.
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Procedure in case of bottom up initiatives:
1. collection of signatures;
2. handing in the signature-collection sheets to the Speaker of Parliament;
3. validation by the National Election Board (within 30 days, only the number 
of valid signatures can be taken into consideration);
4. Parliament  orders  the  referendum  or  rejects  the  initiative  (within  two 
months after the handing in of the initiative; with two-thirds vote);
5. vote (within 3 months after the ordering of the referendum);
6. report of the National Election Board on the result;
7. Parliament includes the result of the referendum in a resolution (→ the 
result is binding for 2 years: a new referendum may not be held nor may 
an act confirmed by referendum be modified within the two years that 
follow).
A complaint can be lodged at the Constitutional Court against the resolution of 
the Parliament (step 4. or 7.)
• when the Parliament rejects a referendum on the basis of failed validation, 
or
• when the Parliament’s resolution violates the lawful regulations pertaining 
to the holding of the referendum and determining the outcome of the vote.
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ANNEX III: POPULAR RIGHTS ACCORDING TO THE 1997 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND THE STEPS OF THE PROCEDURE IN CASE OF A BOTTOM UP INITIATIVE ACCORDING TO 
ACT III OF 1998 ON REFERENDUM AND POPULAR INITIATIVE AND TO ACT C OF 1997 ON ELECTORAL PROCEDURE
Institution Aim
Type
(regarding 
binding force)
Triggering
(% of the 
electorate)
Possible/prescribe
d issues in general Excluded issues
Required 
turnout
Mandatory 
referendum decision binding -
EU accession
(according to art. 79 of 
the Constitution which 
was implemented
in 2002)
-
25%+1
(the 
referendum 
is successful 
if
more than 
half of the 
voters,
but at least 
more than 
one-quarter 
of all eligible 
voters
have given 
the same 
answer)
Popular 
initiative86
(It must be 
held, 
Parliament 
shall order it)
decision binding 200 000 voters(ca. 2,5%)
issues falling under the 
jurisdiction of the 
Parliament
a) laws on the central budget, the execution of  the central 
budget,  taxes  to  the  central  government  and  duties,  customs 
tariffs, and on the central government conditions for local taxes,
b) obligations set forth in valid international treaties and on 
the contents of laws prescribing such obligations,
c) the provisions of the Constitution on national referendums 
and popular initiatives,
d) personnel  and restructuring (reorganization,  termination) 
matters falling under Parliamentary jurisdiction,
e) dissolution of the Parliament,
f) the Government's program,
g) declaration of a state of war, a state of emergency or a 
state of national crisis,
h) use of the Hungarian Armed Forces abroad or within the 
country,
i) dissolution of the representative body of local governments,
j) amnesty.
Optional 
legislative 
referendum
(Parliament 
can deliberate 
whether to 
order it or not)
decision or 
expression 
of opinion
binding or 
consultative
President
Government
one-third of 
Members of the 
Parliament
100 000 voters
(ca. 1,25%)
Agenda 
initiative
put a 
question on 
the agenda
of the 
Parliament
Parliament shall 
debate it
50 000 voters
(ca. 0,625%) - -
86 For the terminology, see above footnote 49.
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Procedure in case of bottom up initiatives:
1. National Election Committee (NEC) validates the specimen of  signature-
collection  sheets  (formal  examination  of  the  sheet  and  substantial 
examination of the question regarding unanimity and permitted/excluded 
matters; decision on admissibility – within 30 days);
2. collection of signatures (4 months), initiators hand in the sheets to the 
NEC;
3. NEC checks the amount of valid signatures (within 45 days) and inform the 
Speaker of the House;
4. Parliament  orders  the  referendum  (within  15  days)  and  informs  the 
President;
5. the President sets the date of the referendum;
6. vote (within 90 days after the Parliament’s resolution);
7. NEC declares the result;
8. Parliament executes the decision of the referendum, e.g. enacts a law (the 
result is binding for 3 years).
A complaint can be lodged at the Constitutional Court against:
• resolutions of the NEC concerning the validation of the signature-collection 
sheet (1.);
• resolutions of the Parliament concerning the ordering (or rejection) of the 
referendum (4.);
• resolutions of the Parliament concerning the execution (or non-execution) 
of the decision made by referendum (8.).
A complaint can be lodged at the Supreme Court of Hungary against:
• resolutions of the NEC declaring the amount of valid signatures (3.);
• resolutions of the NEC declaring the result of the referendum (7.).
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ANNEX IV: REFERENDUMS IN HUNGARY 1989-2008
Referendum of the 26th November, 1989 (“Four-Yes referendum”):
Subjects/results:
A. the President shall be elected after the first free elections (Result: Yes: 
50,07%)
B. party organisations shall withdraw from work places (Result: Yes: 95%)
C. the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party shall account for its assets (Result: 
Yes: 95%)
D. the Workers’ Militia shall be dissolved (Result: Yes: 95%)
Type: popular initiative
Initiators: four (extra-parliamentary) parties of the opposition
Turnout: 58%
Background: “National  Round  Table  Talks”  between  the  Hungarian  Socialist 
Workers’ Party and oppositional parties had been in process since June 1989; the 
Hungarian  Socialist  Workers’  Party  wanted  its  own candidate  (Imre  Pozsgay) 
elected for President by the people before the free elections, the Free Democrats 
refused  him,  they  –  and  other  oppositional  parties  –  wanted  the  President 
elected by the new Parliament.
Political consequences: The opposition could get rid of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’  Party’s  candidate;  the  Alliance  of  Free  Democrats  (main  initiator) 
gained popularity before the elections; the weakness of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party became obvious.
Referendum of the 29th July, 1990:
Subject: direct election of the President
Tpye: popular initiative
Initiators: Zoltán  Király  (independent  parliamentary  representative);  the 
Hungarian Socialist Party
Turnout: 14%
Result: No (Yes: 86%, No: 14%)
Background: Referendum of the 26th November, 1989; general elections of 1990; 
isolation of the Hungarian Socialist Party.
Political consequences: The idea of a “medium-strong” President remained in the 
Constitution; the Parliament elected the President in August 1990.
Referendum of the 16th November, 1997:
Subject: accession to the NATO
Tpye: optional legislative referendum
Initiator: Government
Turnout: 49%
Result: Yes (Yes: 85%, No: 15%)
Background: Negotiations  between  Hungary  and  NATO on  the  accession  had 
been in process since 1991; all of the parliamentary parties were in favour of the 
accession, only two radical  extra-parliamentary parties campaigned against it. 
The  turnout  was  low;  the  referendum  was  successful  only  because  of  the 
lowering  of  the  threshold  two  weeks  before.  The  suggestive  wording  was 
criticized  (“Do  you  agree  that  the  Republic  of  Hungary  should  guarantee  its 
security by joining the NATO?”)
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Referendum of the 12th April, 2003:
Subject: accession to the European Union
Tpye: mandatory referendum (according to art. 79 of the Constitution)
Turnout: 46%
Result: Yes (Yes: 84%, No: 16%)
Background: Negotiations between Hungary and the EU on the accession had 
been proceeding since 1998. All of the parliamentary parties were in favour of 
the  accession;  opponents  tried  to  present  it  as  a  colonisation.  In  2002,  a 
constitutional amendment ordered a referendum on the accession.
Referendum of the 5th December, 2004:
Subjects:
A. making easier to acquire Hungarian citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living 
abroad
B. prohibition of the privatization of state-owned health care institutions
Tpye: popular initiative
Initiator: A: World Federation of Hungarians; B: Hungarian Communist Workers’ 
Party (extra-parliamentary radical party)
Turnout: 37%
Result: No (subject A: Yes: 51,57%; subject B: Yes: 65%)
Background:
A. The so-called Status Act (2001) accorded benefits to Hungarians living in 
neighbouring countries, but the World Federation of Hungarians insisted 
on a facilitated granted citizenship.
B. In  2003,  the  Parliament  adopted  an  act  enabling  the  participation  of 
private  capital  in  financing  hospitals;  the  Workers’  Party  launched  an 
initiative in order to prohibit the privatization of state-owned health care 
institutions. Although the act was annulled by the Constitutional Court, the 
Workers’  Party continued the campaign and the Parliament ordered the 
referendum. (The Government argued against, the opposition in favour of 
the initiative in both cases.)
Politic  al consequences:  
A. Hungarians  living  abroad  were  disappointed,  the  FIDESZ  promised  to 
adopt  a  law  on  the  citizenship  if  the  party  gets  a  majority  in  the 
Parliament. (It was realized in 2010  political conflict with Slovakia.)→
B. Although  the  initiative  failed,  there  is  a  strong  resistance  against 
privatization of state-owned health care institutions. Such attempts of the 
next Government run aground too.
9th March, 2008 (“Social” or “Three-Yes Referendum”):
Subjects/results:
A. Abolition of “visit-fee” [fee for out-patient treatments] (Result: yes, 82%)
B. Abolition of in-patient hospital care per-diem rate (Result: yes, 84%)
C. Abolition of teaching contribution for higher public education (Result: yes, 
82%)
Tpye: popular initiative
Initiator: FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Union and the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party (parties of the opposition)
Turnout: 50,49%
Background: The Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Liberal Party (SZDSZ) – after 4 
years  of  government  –  won  the  2006  Hungarian  national  elections.  Ferenc 
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Gyurcsány  established  his  second  Government  and  introduced  financial 
restrictions.  After  his  confidential  speech  in  Balatonőszöd  (“we  lied  in  the 
morning, at noon and at night”) went public, serious protests broke out. Two 
parties of the opposition (Fidesz and Christian Democrats) initiated referendums 
on  seven  questions.  Finally  –  after  long  multiple-stage  proceedings  at  the 
National  Election  Committee  and  Constitutional  Court  –  the  National  Election 
Committee validated five questions, but the initiators collected signatures only 
for three questions. The issues became a symbol of the Government’s policies 
and the opposition considered the referendum a decision on the Government’s 
future. The referendum (and especially the Constitutional Court’s decisions on 
the admissibility) divided the intellectuals.
Political consequences: The Government didn’t resign but the coalition broke up 
and the minority Government was not able to proceed with its reform program.
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ANNEX V: IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON REFERENDUM ISSUES
Decision 2/1993. (I. 22.) of the Constitutional Court:
Main  statements:  
a) the primary form of exercising the people’s sovereignty in Hungary is  by 
representation  (  referendums  in  the  parliamentary  system  shall  be→  
complementary in relation to representative exercise of power);
b) a question put on referendum may not contain an implied modification of 
the Constitution;
c) the Parliament can’t be forced to dissolve by means of referendum.
Background: the initiative of the Association of Citizens under the Subsistence 
Minimum Level to dissolve the Parliament by means of referendum.
Consequences:
In 1995, the Parliament refused an initiative of the Independent Smallholder’s 
Party on the direct election of the President, on the extension of his competence 
and on other questions referring to the decision of the Constitutional Court.
The  Parliament  refused  an  initiative  of  the  extra-parliamentary  Hungarian 
Communist Workers’ Party on the NATO accession of Hungary (without any legal 
reasoning: “the question is not timely”).
Decision 52/1997. (X. 14.) of the Constitutional Court:
Main  statements:  
a) a popular initiative shall take priority against the Government’s facultative 
proposition (from the handing in of signatures);
b) although the direct exercise of popular sovereignty is exceptional, in such 
cases however, it supersedes representative power;
c) in case of a referendum aiming a decision the Parliament is forced to adopt 
the relevant law.
Background and consequences: Oppositional parties collected more than 200.000 
signatures  in  order  to  prohibit  foreigners  from  acquiring  agricultural  land  in 
Hungary. Subsequently, the Government proposed another question on the same 
issue. The Parliament decided to put the Government’s question on referendum, 
but  it  couldn’t  be  held  because  of  the  Constitutional  Court’s  decision.  The 
Parliament  refused  to  put  the  other  question  on  referendum,  arguing:  the 
question is not unambiguous. (The power of the National Election Committee to 
examine  and  verify  the  question  before  the  collection  of  signatures  was 
introduced only after, in 1998.)
Decision 25/1999. (VII. 7.) of the Constitutional Court:
Main  statements:  
a) the Constitution can’t be revised by means of bottom up initiative;
b) a revision of the Constitution adopted already by the Parliament can be 
approved by means of referendum.
Background: The Social Democratic Youth League proposed a referendum about 
the direct election of the President; the  National Election Committee validated 
the  specimen  of  the  signature-collecting  sheets.  The  Constitutional  Court 
repealed the National Election Committee’s decision.
33
C2D Working Paper Series 35/2010
Consequence: Although in the list of excluded subjects it is not forbidden, there 
is no room for bottom up initiatives aiming a total or a partial revision of the 
Constitution.
Decision 52/2001. (XI. 29.) of the Constitutional Court:
Main  statements:  
The question put on referendum must be unambiguous from two perspectives:
a) the voters have to be able to answer it with “yes” or “no”, it shall be clear 
and open to one interpretation only;
b) the Parliament has to be able to decide, whether it is obliged to adopt a 
law and if yes, what kind of a law.
Background: The Socialist Party initiated a referendum on the amendment of the 
Hungarian Labour Code: “Do you agree that the Labour Code guarantees for the 
employees weekly two days of holyday, one of them on Sunday, and that the 
work on holidays must be paid extra?” The Constitutional Court stated that the 
question includes two questions: one on the amount of weekly holidays and the 
other one the wages. The second doesn’t follow from the first; the voters can’t 
decide separately.
Consequences:
a) The proposed question may include more questions but their connection 
must be clear, one must follow from the other.
b) The  decision  opened  the  door  to  an  argumentation  with  the  “new 
circumstance”: if a “new circumstance” (e.g. the modification of the legal 
environment) arises after the validation of the signature-collection sheet, 
it may have a negative effect on the unanimity of the question from the 
perspective of the Parliament (it can’t decide whether it is obliged under 
the new circumstances to adopt a law and if yes, what kind of a law).
Decision 40/2004. (X. 27.) of the Constitutional Court:
Main  statement:  
• It is possible that a “new circumstance” arises after the validation process 
(National Election Committee decision and eventually Constitutional Court 
decision). “New circumstance” can be for e.g. a constitutional amendment 
or a new international treaty. In such a case – if a complaint is lodged at 
the Constitutional Court against the Parliament’s resolution concerning the 
ordering of the referendum – the Constitutional Court may reconsider the 
admissibility  of  the  question  which  has  already  been  admitted  in  the 
validation process.
Background: Initiative concerning the prohibition of the privatisation of state-
owned health care institutions.
Consequence: The “new circumstance” became an important argument of the 
Constitutional  Court  for  the  rejection  of  a  question  in  such  cases  where  the 
Parliament  –  after  the  validation  of  the  question  –  adopted  a  new law or  a 
revision which meets the intention of the initiative.  [E.g.: Decisions 67/2004. 
(IV. 30.) and 130/2008. (XI. 3.) of the Constitutional Court.]
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Decision 130/2008. (XI. 3.) of the Constitutional Court:
Main  statements:  
a) a referendum (popular initiative) which intends a decision has the primary 
purpose to oblige the Parliament to adopt or abolish a law;
b) a referendum (popular initiative) may have – secondarily – the purpose to 
oblige  the  Parliament  to  abstain  from enacting  a  law,  but  only  if  the 
referendum counteracts a real endeavour for legislation (e.g. the draft is in 
preparation, it has been completed or has been brought in as a bill).
Background: In 2008 the Parliament adopted a law introducing a new health 
insurance  system  based  on  the  competition  of  private  insurance  companies 
(market-based  health  insurance  system).  Two  private  individuals  initiated  a 
referendum on  the  question:  “Do  you  agree  that  an  obligatory  multi-player 
market-based health insurance system should not be introduced in Hungary?” 
After the validation of the signature-collection sheet the Parliament abolished the 
law and the Government renounced its intentions to introduce the market-based 
health insurance system. However, the Parliament – accepting the decision of the 
National  Election  Committee  on  the  validation  of  the  sheet  –  ordered  the 
referendum. The Constitutional Court refused it with the arguments mentioned 
above.
Consequences:
• If the Parliament complies with the intention of a popular initiative and – 
after  the  validation  of  the  signature  collection  sheet  but  before  the 
ordering the referendum – revise (adopt, abolish) the law, the referendum 
can’t be held.
• In this way the Parliament can circumvent the rule that the result of the 
referendum is binding for 3 years.
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